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Triggered by recent flood catastrophes and increasing concerns about climate change,
scientists as well as policy-makers increasingly call for making long-term water
policies to enable a transformation towards flood resilience. A key question is how to
make these long-term policies adaptive so that they are able to deal with uncertainties
and changing circumstances. The paper proposes three conditions for making long-
term water policies adaptive, which are then used to evaluate a new Dutch water
policy approach called ‘Adaptive Delta Management’. Analysing this national policy
approach and its translation to the Rotterdam region reveals that Dutch policy-makers
are torn between adaptability and the urge to control. Reflecting on this dilemma, the
paper suggests a stronger focus on monitoring and learning to strengthen the
adaptability of long-term water policies. Moreover, increasing the adaptive capacity
of society also requires a stronger engagement with local stakeholders including
citizens and businesses.
Keywords: adaptive policies; strategic planning; flood risk management; flood
resilience; Dutch water management
1. Introduction
Uncertainties have always existed in policy-making (see for example Friend and Jessop
1969); what has changed more recently, however, is the way we view uncertainties.
Before, an optimistic view of science as “steadily advancing in the certainty of
knowledge and control of the natural world” (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, 739)
dominated, leading to reductionist approaches trying to diminish or ignore uncertainty.
Nowadays, uncertainties have become accepted as ‘an unavoidable fact of life’, also in
water management (Brugnach et al. 2008).
In water management, the most pressing uncertainty at the moment is climate change:
most scientists agree that the climate will be changing with effects on sea levels,
precipitation patterns and storm frequency; nonetheless, predictions are still uncertain, in
particular for the regional and the local level (Cooney 2012; Jeuken and Reeder 2011).
Moreover, future socio-economic development and interactions with the hydrological
system are difficult to foresee (see Haasnoot et al. 2011). Water policy-makers are hence
trapped: on the one hand, climate change has become an undeniable subject and asks for
long-term planning; on the other hand, policy-makers also face ‘unknown unknowns’
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(Termeer and van den Brink 2013) which means they do not know how to plan and what
to plan for.
Within this context, scientists as well as policy-makers have been attracted by the
resilience concept. Resilience is widely acknowledged as a new approach to incorporate
uncertainty into planning, in particular with respect to natural hazards such as flooding
(Davoudi 2012; Scott 2013; White 2010). Applied to flooding, the idea of resilience
promises that a system like an urban region is prepared for both, the probability and the
consequences of flooding, and is even capable to transform to a new, less flood prone
state when necessary (Restemeyer, Woltjer, and van den Brink 2015). However, although
resilience is highly advocated in theory, and increasingly adopted in policy discourses,
there remains a lack of empirical insights of how to govern for resilience in practice
(Wilkinson 2012).
Various authors suggest that resilience requires an adaptive planning and
management approach  one that can induce change and simultaneously is capable of
responding to change (e.g. Holling 1978; Folke et al. 2005; Pahl-Wostl 2006; Wilkinson
2011b; Innes and Booher 2010). What this practically means for making long-term water
policies has only recently been put on the research agenda (Reeder and Ranger 2011;
Walker, Haasnoot, and Kwakkel 2013; Haasnoot et al. 2013). The focus, however, has
mainly been on techniques and tools to make strategies more flexible (e.g. ‘adaptation
pathways’, see Haasnoot et al. 2013), without paying much attention to the underlying
conditions for achieving resilience, namely the content of the strategies and the
governance process in which they are made and implemented. The aim of this paper is to
complete the picture by defining main conditions for making long-term, adaptive water
policies which can be used to evaluate current governance practices. Moreover, we
inform current literature with an in-depth case.
The case comes from the Netherlands, a country known for their long-standing history
in water management, often being a front runner in the debate. Currently, the Dutch are
the first ones to apply an adaptive policy-making approach to a whole country, not only
to a city or a region. The Adaptive Delta Management (ADM) approach is put forward in
the recent Delta Programme, a comprehensive policy programme set out on a national
scale and substantiated on a regional and local scale. With the ADM approach, the
Netherlands aims at ensuring flood protection and freshwater supply until 2100 while
remaining adaptable to changing climate and social conditions.
The paper presents the case by looking at the national level as well as the highly
urbanised Rotterdam region. Prior to the empirical analysis, we define three conditions
for making long-term water policies adaptive by combining insights from resilience and
adaptive planning and governance literature. The case is tested against these theoretically
defined conditions, illustrating that the ideas of resilience and adaptability are only
partially adopted. In the conclusions, we give some recommendations for increasing
adaptability in the Dutch case and draw several lessons for making long-term, adaptive
water policies in general.
2. Towards flood resilience: making long-term and adaptive water policies
In flood risk management, resilience is often associated with the shift from ‘fighting the
water’ to ‘living with the water’. It is based on the assumption that the chance of flooding
can never fully be eliminated; hence, the land and the people behind the first protection
line should be prepared for dealing with floods (Scott 2013; White 2010).
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This reasoning goes back to a shifting world view. Traditional flood control is rooted
in an anthropocentric world view, assuming that water can be predicted and controlled by
humans. Instead, resilience thinking, and particularly more recent understandings coined
‘socialecological resilience’ or ‘evolutionary resilience’, emphasises the various
interactions and the continuous evolvement of social and ecological systems (Adger et al.
2005; Chandler 2014; Davoudi 2012; Folke et al. 2010; Gunderson and Holling 2002).
Uncertainties can then arise because of an unpredictable system behaviour, a lack of
information and overview, and differing stakeholders’ values and beliefs (Christensen
1985; Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993; Brugnach et al. 2008).
This world view implies that planning and management attempts can turn out
differently than expected, yet we argue in line with other scholars (such as Davoudi 2012;
Folke et al. 2005; Walker et al. 2004) that resilience can still be influenced by societal
actors. Although flooding cannot be controlled, our environment can be adapted to be
able to cope with flooding. Subsequently, policy-making should not only concentrate on
short-term emergency responses to alleviate suffering after a flood event, as is often the
case today (F€unfgeld and Mcevoy 2012), but instead proactively build adaptive capacity
(Davoudi 2012). This requires a new type of strategic policy and decision-making: while
a long-term perspective is needed to enable a transformation, acknowledging
uncertainties also requires room for adjustment along the way; there is a need for
‘adaptive’ water policies.
Drawing from insights about flood management (e.g. Hartmann and J€upner 2013; Vis
et al. 2003), adaptive management (e.g. Pahl-Wostl 2006; Allen et al. 2011), adaptive co-
management (e.g. Armitage 2008; Berkes 2008), adaptive governance (e.g. Folke et al.
2005; Dewulf, Meijerink, and Runhaar 2015), adaptive planning (Wilkinson 2011a;
Balducci et al. 2011) and adaptive policy-making (e.g. Walker, Haasnoot, and Kwakkel
2013; Reeder and Ranger 2011), we argue that three points are crucial for making long-
term water policies more adaptive; namely, (1) an agile governance process, (2) make
flexible strategies and plans and (3) prioritise measures that prevent lock-ins.
2.1. An agile governance process
Two aspects crucial for dealing with uncertainties and fostering resilience are
collaboration and social learning (Armitage 2008; Folke et al. 2005). The general
reasoning is that complex issues, like adaptation to climate change, involve diverging
interests and are difficult to resolve (Dewulf, Meijerink, and Runhaar 2015).
Collaboration calls for ‘multi-level’, ‘multi-actor’ and ‘multi-sector’ arrangements
(Gupta et al. 2010). Because dealing with flood risk and climate change is a cross-cutting
theme, multiple sectors, such as water management, spatial planning and nature
conversation, need to be involved. Next to various governmental bodies, also non-
governmental actors should be included to better understand the problem and the context
(Pahl-Wostl 2009; Berkes and Folke 2002). Involving multiple levels (local, regional,
national and even international) is important to improve information flows and
knowledge exchange between these levels (Armitage 2008); in particular for issues such
as water which do not stop at administrative borders (Pahl-Wostl 2009). The general
assumption is that multi-level, multi-actor and multi-sector arrangements foster learning:
by combining multiple forms of knowledge the context can be better understood and
finding innovative solutions can be stimulated (Pahl-Wostl 2009).
For making long-term water policies, we argue that agility asks for two ingredients:
the capacity to steer towards a desired direction as well as the capacity to adjust based on
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new insights. Steering capacity can be associated with leadership. Two types of
leadership seem to be crucial for making long-term policies; namely, ‘visionary’ and
‘collaborative’ leadership. Visionary leadership allows for making long-term visions
which are necessary to enable a transformation towards a desired future (Gupta et al.
2010). Collaborative leadership refers to key individuals encouraging collaboration
among different actors, which is essential in multi-level, multi-actor and multi-sector
arrangements (Folke et al. 2005; Armitage 2008).
The capacity to adjust presumes social learning. It requires, on the one hand,
generating new insights, for instance through collaboration or experiments (Folke et al.
2002; Ahern 2011). On the other hand, it asks for continuously monitoring and evaluating
practices and contextual circumstances (Allen et al. 2011). Feeding these insights back
into the decision-making process should be subject to a broader collaborative process
with recurring moments for reassessment (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007). Monitoring and social
learning can therefore be seen as two aspects that belong together (Cundill and Fabricius
2009).
Next to an agile governance process, a broader strategy or plan is required that
balances short-term decisions with long-term considerations. Keeping this plan flexible is
necessary to deal with uncertainties.
2.2. Make flexible strategies and plans
A more flexible strategy-making process does not start with a fixed, detailed end goal in
mind, but means and ends can be adapted along the way (Balducci et al. 2011). Literature
suggests three interrelated tools to make long-term plans more adaptable, namely
scenarios, tipping points and adaptation pathways (Reeder and Ranger 2011; Walker,
Haasnoot, and Kwakkel 2013; Haasnoot et al. 2013).
Scenarios can be a useful technique to anticipate the future and thus, improve
understanding of what might come and what to prepare for (Albrechts 2005; Wilkinson
2011a; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007). The power of scenarios is that they do not merely
extrapolate the past and present, but present a range of possible futures. That way,
scenarios can help to develop a set of measures to be prepared for each future. At the
same time, they can indicate what to do to reach a preferred future (Albrechts 2005).
Tipping points and adaptation pathways, also called ‘route-map approach’ (Reeder
and Ranger 2011) or ‘dynamic adaptive policy pathways’ (Haasnoot et al. 2013), can
help policy-makers to think about the long run, moments when a measure is no longer
sufficient and which measures would be a logical follow-up. This approach has only
recently been developed together with water managers in England and the Netherlands
(W.E. Walker, Haasnoot, and Kwakkel 2013).
An adaptation pathway orders various measures in time, spanning from now until a
defined time horizon (Reeder and Ranger 2011). Not all of these measures have to be
taken; it depicts more various options and which measures work well together. According
to Haasnoot et al. (2013), an adaptation pathway aims to show how long a measure is
effective; the moment when a measure turns ineffective is defined as a ‘tipping point’. A
tipping point can be reached sooner or later, depending on the pace of, for instance,
climate change. Thinking about tipping points can therefore be informed by scenarios.
An adaptation pathway depicts these tipping points and shows which measures can be
taken as a follow-up. Thereby, an adaptation pathway should inform short-term decision-
making without compromising long-term options; it can be a means to show which set of
measures keeps options open and creates multiple benefits (Haasnoot et al. 2013).
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Keeping options open is important to prevent ‘lock-ins’. Why this is important and which
measures are less likely to cause a lock-in will be discussed in the next section.
2.3. Prioritise measures that prevent lock-ins
The strong focus on technical flood protection that dominated the last century is often
considered to have caused a ‘lock-in’ (Huitema and Meijerink 2010; Wesselink et al.
2007; White 2013). A lock-in can be defined as a situation in which sub-optimal solutions
persist because they have materialised in the physical, as well as the social, environment;
lock-ins result from ‘path dependence’ which means that the flexibility of a system is
limited by how a system developed in the past (Martin and Simmie 2008; Couch, Sykes,
and B€orstinghaus 2011). In the past, a flood control approach was often chosen because it
gave room for developments and hence brought prosperity. Today, the disadvantages are
recognised: traditional flood control is expensive, in several places economically
infeasible, disadvantageous for nature and, above all, increases vulnerability because
development in the hinterland took place without any restrictions (Hartmann and J€upner
2013; Vis et al. 2003; Liao 2014). Nonetheless, stepping over to a different approach is
extremely difficult because flood control has ‘materialised’ in terms of physical artefacts
such as dikes, dams and sluices as well as social constructs such as water institutions
(Huitema and Meijerink 2010; Wesselink et al. 2007).
According to B. Walker et al. (2004), the goal of managing resilience should be to
“successfully avoid crossing into an undesirable system regime, or succeed in crossing
back to a desirable one”. In other words, it is about preventing or getting out of lock-in
situations. This does not mean that a resilience strategy in flood risk management will not
include large-scale infrastructure anymore. Large-scale infrastructure will always remain
important to withstand flood events (Restemeyer, Woltjer, and van den Brink 2015).
However, next to this, it is important to reduce the vulnerability of the physical and social
environment to be prepared for a potential flood (Liao 2014). This shift is partly already
visible in flood risk management, which has developed from a rather sectoral policy field
to a more holistic risk management, targeted at reducing not only the probability, but also
the consequences of flooding (Meijerink and Dicke 2008, White 2010).
Breaking free from the current lock-in would mean adjusting the physical
environment, for instance adapting existing buildings through wet- or dry-proofing or
adjusting land uses by the means of spatial planning (White 2010). Creating more space
for water can also be a means to reduce the probability of flooding, for instance by giving
more room for the river, which offers benefits for flood protection, nature development
and recreational purposes (Vis et al. 2003). Vulnerability of the hinterland can further be
reduced through risk communication and disaster management (O’Sullivan et al. 2012;
Smith 2013). Because these measures are either easily reversible or offer multiple
benefits, they are less path-dependent than dikes, dams or sluices. They can therefore be
useful measures to prevent or move out of a lock-in (Liao 2014).
In summary, all three points are about fostering resilience by making long-term water
policies that are capable of dealing with change and uncertainty. The first is about the
governance process in which the strategy-making takes place; the second is about
the flexibility of strategies and the third is about measures and hence the actual content of
the policy. Together they address the key questions subject to every planning process,
namely what to do, how to do it and whom to involve. Each condition implies a shift for
flood risk management, particularly for a country like the Netherlands known for its
technocratic culture (Lintsen 2002; Wesselink et al. 2007; van den Brink, 2010). From a
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rather centralised and hierarchical management to a governance process based on
collaboration and learning; from large-scale interventions like the Delta Works to flexible
strategies and plans, and from a focus on technical engineering measures to a more
holistic risk management. By exploring the case of the Dutch Delta Programme, we will
examine to what extent these points have already landed in practice and how Dutch
policy-makers attempt to develop a more adaptive approach.
3. Case introduction and methodology
The Delta Programme is a national policy programme in the Netherlands set up to advise
the national government on how to ensure flood protection and freshwater supply until
2100. It was established in 2010 based on the advice of the so-called Delta Commission
because of increasing concerns about climate change (Deltacommissie 2008). It is a
follow-up of the historical first Delta Programme established after the flood disaster of
1953, which made the Netherlands famous for their water-engineering skills, manifested
in the so-called Delta Works (van der Brugge, Rotmans, and Loorbach 2005). While the
first Delta Programme was rather engineering-driven, the current Delta Programme
proclaims to follow an adaptive and integrated approach. Thereby, the Netherlands
attempts to create synergies between various policy fields with one of the goals being to
avoid over- and underinvestment.
The Delta Programme is institutionally embedded in the form of the ‘5 D’s’. The
Delta Act ensures that there is a Delta Commissioner and a Delta Fund of 1 billion € per
year (public funding, at least until 2028). The Delta Commissioner is a public servant at
the top of the Delta Programme, who ensures that a Delta Programme report is published
every year, reporting on the progress of the Delta Programme towards the cabinet and the
general public. Besides, he is responsible for developing and implementing the so-called
Delta Decisions which represent the main choices with respect to flood protection and
freshwater supply until 2100. The Delta Decisions were prepared between 2010 and
June 2014. Currently, they are being incorporated into existing policy instruments,
such as the National Water Plan and the Flood Protection Programme (in Dutch:
Hoogwaterbeschermingsprogramma). Although the Delta Programme is a national
programme, it was further substantiated in nine sub-programmes working on a specific
topic (e.g. freshwater) or region (e.g. Wadden). The Delta Programme can therefore be
seen as an overarching organisation bundling resources and people working on water
policy in the Netherlands.
To gain insights into the policy process and how the involved policy-makers defined
and operationalised an adaptive approach, we studied the interaction between the national
and regional level in depth by zooming in on one regional sub-programme. Rijnmond-
Drechtsteden was selected as it is the most urbanised sub-programme, comprising
1.6 million inhabitants and the city and harbour of Rotterdam with international
economic significance (see Figure 1). Sea and rivers meet in this region, hence the sub-
programme focused on tidal as well as fluvial flooding.1
We applied a mixed-method approach consisting of policy document analysis, in-depth
interviews with key actors, and participatory observation. The aim of the policy document
analysis was to improve our understanding of the general governance process of the Delta
Programme, the principles of the ADM approach, and the developed strategies and
measures. For this purpose, we examined the guideline for implementing ADM and yearly
progress reports from the national Delta Programme, as well as the regional sub-
programme (Deltacommissie 2008; Delta Programme 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014;
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Deltaprogramma Rijnmond-Drechtsteden 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; Handreiking Adaptief
Deltamanagement 2012). We chose to study these policy documents as they were
produced by the policy-makers themselves, presenting the results of the preceding
negotiation processes. Policy documents can therefore be seen as “social facts” (Atkinson
and Coffey 1997, 47). However, policy documents might spare information or only present
the ‘bright side’ of the story (Bowen 2009). We therefore also included voices ‘outside’ of
the Delta Programme into our analysis, by searching for critiques in professional journals
(e.g. Cobouw 2015/10/03, De Ingenieur 2014/09/10), on websites and so-called ‘grey
documents’ from interest groups (e.g. LTO Website 2014/09/17; WNF 2012). Moreover,
we triangulated the document analysis with interviews and participatory observation.
The interviews gave us insights about the story ‘untold’ in the policy documents,
namely how collaboration with governmental and non-governmental actors was
perceived and which problems occurred when putting the ADM approach into practice.
We held 10 interviews with key stakeholders from the national as well as regional level.
These stakeholders were either selected due to their direct involvement in the ADM
process or their central position in the governance structure (see Table 1). The semi-
structured interview guide comprised questions about their understanding of the ADM
concept, the application of ADM and the governance process of the Delta Programme.
The aim of the participatory observations was to experience the translation process
first hand and to contextualise the stories of the interviewees. For that purpose, we
participated in several meetings from the regional programme team between December
2013 and June 2014. This time period was chosen because it was the final phase of the
regional programme team, where they had to develop a preferred strategy explicitly
linked to ADM. In these meetings, our level of participation was moderate (see Hennink,
Hutter, and Bailey 2011). All participants knew that we were investigating the sub-
programme, we were sitting at the same table as the programme team members and we
Figure 1. The Rijnmond-Drechtsteden region in the Netherlands, including the flood barriers in the
area (designed by author).
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became part of their email list and therefore received all documents and minutes of their
meetings. However, we did not actively participate in the discussions to keep enough
distance to our object of analysis and thus ensure our objectivity as a researcher.
In addition, we attended two of the yearly organised National Delta Congresses (2013
in Utrecht and 2014 in Amersfoort), a symposium on Adaptive Delta Management (June
2013 in Enschede) and two lectures given by national Delta Staff members in Groningen
(in 2013 and 2014).
The collected data (policy documents, observation protocols and interview transcripts)
were analysed with Atlas.TI, a computer program for qualitative data analysis. We used
deductive and inductive codes to mark all text passages fitting under the umbrella of the
three conditions for making long-term, adaptive water policies defined in Section 2.
Together, they show how the Delta Programme operationalised an adaptive approach, with
the inductive codes showing specific ideas coming forth from the Delta Programme. Within
these marked text passages, we were looking for reoccurring themes and representative
quotes, which finally brought us to the results as presented in Sections 46. To validate our
findings, we presented our results to the regional programme team in May 2014.
4. The Dutch Delta Programme  an agile governance process?
4.1. Steering capacity
The Delta Programme has a high steering capacity through a strong institutional
embedding, also referred to as ‘the 5 D’s’: the Delta Act, Delta Fund, Delta Programme
reports, Delta Decisions and Delta Commissioner (see Section 3). In particular, the
creation of a new temporary figure in the political landscape of the Netherlands, the Delta
Commissioner, shows how high water is placed on the political agenda (van Twist et al.
2013). In Dutch history, commissioners have only been installed if a topic deserved
Table 1. List of interviewees including motivation why they were chosen.
Interviewee Choice for interviewee Type Date
Delta Staff member ‘Founder’ of the ADM approach, responsible
for ADM on national level
Face-to-face 20-01-2014
External advisor Assisting regional sub-programmes in
applying ADM
Face-to-face 21-03-2014
Programme dirtector
Rijnmond-D’rechtsteden
General overview as programme director Face-to-face 06-12-2013
Programme team member
Rijnmond-D’rechtsteden
Responsible for ADM in early phase Face-to-face 21-02-2014
Programme team member
Rijnmond-D’rechtsteden
Responsible for ADM in closing phase Face-to-face 21-02-2014
Programme team member
Rijnmond-D’rechtsteden
Involved with ADM by writing the final
advice
Face-to-face 16-05-2014
Programme team member
Rijnmond-D’rechtsteden
Involved with ADM by writing the final
advice
Face-to-face 16-05-2014
Programme team member
Rijnmond-D’rechtsteden
Involved with ADM by building the
evidence base for strategies
Face-to-face 02-07-2014
Head of Advisory Committee
Rijnmond-D’rechtsteden
General overview as head of Advisory
Committe
Face-to-face 14-05-2014
Head of Scientific Reflection
Group Rijnmond-
D’rechtsteden
General overview as head of Scientific
Reflection Group
Phone 19-05-2014
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special attention (van Twist et al. 2013). Appointed by the government in 2010 for seven
years, he is particularly responsible for involving all relevant parties and guaranteeing the
coherence of the developed strategies. The Delta Commissioner interacts closely with
the ministers of Infrastructure and Environment and Economic Affairs and may even be
the spokesman in the Cabinet and the House of Parliament, if the minister of
Infrastructure and Environment asks him to do so. The Delta Programme therefore has
the power to bring about change.
The Delta Programme incorporated the multi-level idea; policy-making
simultaneously took place on the national and the regional level. Figure 2 shows the
structure of the Delta Programme and the interaction between the national level and the
regional level with the example of the regional sub-programme Rijnmond-Drechtsteden.
This governance set-up followed directly from the advice of a national commission
concerning infrastructure projects (Commissie Elverding 2008).
The national level, consisting of the Delta Commissioner and his Delta Staff (around
10 people mainly recruited from ministries2), primarily determined the process by
defining deliverables for each year. The sub-programmes were asked to carry out a
problem analysis in the first year, develop ‘possible strategies’ (in Dutch: ‘mogelijke
strategie€en’) in the second year, elaborate ‘promising strategies’ (in Dutch: ‘kansrijke
strategie€en’) in the third year and choose a ‘preferred strategy’ (in Dutch:
‘voorkeursstrategie’) during the fourth year. The preferred strategy formed the final
advice for the Delta Decisions in 2015.
The actual content of the strategies, however, was developed by the core working group
on the regional level: the ‘programme team’ consisting of around 25 people2 mainly from
ministries, provinces, municipalities and water boards. The developed strategies gained
their political legitimacy through the regional ‘steering committee’, comprising seven
political representatives from all levels, ranging from the mayor of Rotterdam and local
aldermen to representatives from the ministry of Infrastructure and Environment. They
officially approved the plans and strategies developed within the sub-programme.
The parallel policy-making process stimulated a ‘joint-fact finding phase’, in which a
variety of stakeholders from different backgrounds (i.e. professionals and academics
from different disciplines such as water management, planning and agriculture) and
different levels (national, regional, local) were brought together to discuss the issues at
Figure 2. Structure of Delta Programme and regional sub-programme Rijnmond-Drechtsteden
(modified from Vreugdenhil and Wijermans 2012).
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stake. That way, the Delta Programme tried to find new ideas and integrated solutions
tailor-made for and broadly accepted by the region.
Nevertheless, the Delta Programme remained overall rather government- and expert-
driven. As van Buuren (2013) already concluded, the Delta Programme relied strongly on
expert knowledge from the water domain with little involvement of local stakeholders
and citizens. Non-governmental stakeholders were only represented in the form of an
Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee consisted of 11 persons from social
organisations, each representing a different interest such as nature, agriculture or
shipping. Regarding their role in the strategy-making process the chairman of the
Advisory Committee stated:
A drawback from the Delta Programme is that the consultation structure is limited to
governments. I find the advisory boards too weak. You should give social organisations a
clearer place; then you share responsibilities for decision-making. Now, they are often a bit
too far away from the process.
Businesses and citizens did not have a formal role in the strategy-making process. As
such, it still resembles a more technocratic approach to water management. An
explanation can be that providing ‘dry feet’ is part of the Dutch constitution; the
government therefore feels high responsibility. It bears the risk though that public
authorities remain caught in their old patterns, generating less innovative solutions and
new insights than needed. On the other hand, the Delta Programme was also actively
searching for new insights outside the public realm.
4.2. Capacity to adjust based on new insights
Knowledge generation stood central in the Delta Programme, resulting in a close
interaction between knowledge institutes and policy-makers. For example, the Delta
Programme was closely interacting with the national research programme ‘Knowledge
for Climate’ (in Dutch: ‘Kennis voor Klimaat’), in which various universities and
research institutes were exploring solutions for making the Netherlands climate proof.
Moreover, all sub-programmes were asked to formulate particular research questions,
which would then be answered by research institutes hired by the Delta Staff. Rijnmond-
Drechtsteden also had a Scientific Reflection Group as a consultation board for the
programme team. The Scientific Reflection Group consisted of 12 professors and
researchers from various universities; they were frequently consulted by the programme
team. Moreover, the Delta Programme created the Top Sector Water  a collaboration of
the Dutch government, business companies as well as research institutes working on
innovative water technologies.
Still, the capacity to adjust based on new insights remained rather underdeveloped in
the governance process of the Delta Programme. The ‘Delta Decisions’ were developed
in a rather linear filtering process. It is not clear what will happen if the underlying
assumptions change. Only the most recent Delta Programme makes clear that the national
level will take a lead in setting up a monitoring system in the future; it aims at connecting
to other running policy programmes (Delta Programme 2014). Whether this future
programme will establish the necessary linkages between monitoring on the one hand and
learning from the monitoring results on the other (eventually leading to policy
adjustment) remains to be seen. A clear strategy for establishing these feedback moments
is at least not visible in the governance process; to what extent the strategies are still
flexible can be evaluated by taking a closer look at the ADM approach.
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5. ADM making flexible strategies
5.1. National ADM principles
The Delta Programme (2010, 68) acknowledges that knowledge about the future is by
definition incomplete, but uncertainty “can be made manageable”. For this purpose, the
ADM approach was developed. According to the Delta Programme report (2012, 45),
ADM “means doing what is necessary, neither too much nor too little, while not ruling
out future options”.
For applying ADM, the national staff supported the regional level with an
implementation guideline (Handreiking Adaptief Deltamanagement 2012) as well as
personnel. Two external advisors from private companies could be hired by the sub-
programmes to help them in putting ADM into practice, one of which also wrote the
implementation guideline. The national level stimulated and facilitated ADM in the sub-
programmes, but they did not dictate anything. As one of the external advisors said:
“There was a guideline, they [the sub-programmes] could hire people like me, but in
principle they had to do it themselves”.
Because the Delta Programme was closely cooperating with the policy-makers and
scientists from England and the Netherlands that developed the idea of adaptation
pathways, the ADM implementation guideline suggests working with scenarios, tipping
points and adaptation pathways. Based on scenarios for climate change (from the Royal
Netherlands Meteorological Institute) and socio-economic development from 2006 (from
the Netherlands Assessment Agencies), four futures were chosen, the so-called Delta
Scenarios, that either assume rapid or moderate climate change, socio-economic growth
or socio-economic decline (see Figure 3). It was a conscious choice to work with the four
most plausible scenarios, although further-reaching scenarios were considered, as a Delta
Staff member explains: “It is a policy choice not to prepare for very extreme or worst
cases. We designed the strategies for plausible futures. The strategies that were finally
selected were tested for more extreme scenarios”.
The ADM implementation guideline demands that strategies should be ‘robust’ and
‘flexible’ at the same time. According to a Delta Staff member, robustness means that a
strategy works in all plausible futures (the Delta Scenarios), whereas flexibility means
that  depending on the contextual circumstances  you can cut one strategy off and
Figure 3. The four ‘Delta Scenarios’ (Delta Programme 2012, 14).
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switch to another one. Identifying tipping points and making adaptation pathways, hence
ordering various possible measures in time, was supposed to help in finding robust and
flexible strategies. For being flexible, however, you need to know when to take action or
change course, hence when a tipping point is reached. It presumes that you keep track of
external developments, as well as the effects of certain measures, for example through
monitoring. Such a monitoring system is still lacking though. The difficulty lies in finding
appropriate parameters. A Delta Staff member responsible for ADM gave an example:
You need a parameter that you can keep track of and that shows you on time: now we really
have to do something in addition to what we have decided on earlier. That works perfectly
for sea level rise; the Netherlands, however, does not only have to deal with sea level rise,
but also with river discharge.
River discharge however, conversely to sea level rise, can gradually rise for a certain
period and at some point be very little again. It can go up and down without a certain
pattern. In practice, identifying climate indications from discharge monitoring is
perceived as a nearly impossible task as variability is large. The Delta Programme
therefore chose to assume a fixed river discharge. They plan for accommodating 17,000
m3/s in 2050 and 18,000 m3/s in 2100. The Delta Staff member responsible for ADM
recognises that this goes against the idea of flexibility: “It is kind of contradictory,
because you actually say that, well, that you cannot rely on monitoring so you base your
decisions on ‘artificially fixed’ worst case future conditions”.
Practice therefore reveals an interesting paradox intrinsic to working with tipping
points and adaptation pathways. It assumes that we can actually know tipping points
beforehand, or at least recognise them when they are reached. The difficulty of finding
appropriate parameters, illustrated with the example of river discharge, shows the limits
of our foresight capabilities though. While some indicators, such as sea level rise, can be
tackled, others (e.g. river discharge) cannot. Choosing a fixed value in the end resembles
more a ‘predict and control’ than an adaptive approach.
5.2. Rijnmond-Drechtsteden: working with scenarios, tipping points and adaptation
pathways
The regional sub-programme Rijnmond-Drechtsteden also experienced other difficulties
in practice. Working with scenarios, for example, is easier said than done. The external
advisor helping the sub-programmes with ADM said:
Thinking in four scenarios was too difficult for people. That went completely different in
practice than we thought. They actually only worked out the ‘steam’ scenario, because it is
the worst case. And what then often happened is that they also made a sensitivity analysis for
the ‘rest’ scenario. That seemed to be cognitively feasible for people.
Rijnmond-Drechtsteden was a sub-programme that actively worked with all four
scenarios; they first translated the more general Delta Scenarios to the regional
context (see Deltaprogramma Rijnmond-Drechtsteden 2011). But also in this sub-
programme the effectiveness of strategies was only calculated for two scenarios
(‘steam’ and ‘rest’) and the worst-case scenario (‘steam’) was considered to be the
most important one. Interestingly, they came to the conclusion that the scenario
actually does not matter too much. Whatever scenario it will be, today’s system of
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dikes and storm surge barriers can cope with it: improvements are necessary, but no
radical changes are required (Deltaprogramma Rijnmond-Drechtsteden 2014).
Obviously, this also had to do with the conscious choice of preparing not for the
most extreme scenarios on the national level.
The conclusion that radical changes in the water system are not required also made it
difficult for them to identify tipping points and visualise adaptation pathways. One
member of the programme team responsible for ADM explained:
We were very much searching for tipping points: moments that a strategy does not work
anymore and that you really have to step over to another one. Our conclusion was that we do
not have those moments in time. Then ADM gets much simpler, because that means that,
with heavy climate scenarios, you do things earlier than with light climate scenarios. So it is
more about spreading measures in time than that there are moments where you say, “Oh,
now we really have to step over to another strategy”.
The general strategy until 2100 therefore seems rather determined, leaving little room
for adjustments along the way (see Figure 4). The only option mentioned is the
adjustment of the discharge distribution, which would imply reconsidering by how
much dikes need to be strengthened. Although not clear from the figure, they consider it
to be adaptive in the sense that they will do more or less of each measure depending on
climate and socio-economic developments. How this will be evaluated, however, is not
clear. The programme director adds another interesting point:
Figure 4. Adaptation pathway developed in the regional sub-programme RD (translated from
Deltaprogramma Rijnmond-Drechtsteden 2014).
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If there are two options to create extra storage capacity in an area and there is now the
willingness to invest in them, then it is also better to do it now, even if the measures are only
necessary after 2050. Hence, this [points at the ADM scheme] is of course nice, but the
political reality is often different, and the political reality is in general more determining.
Working with scenarios, tipping points and adaptation pathways is therefore not only
rather complex; issues like power and money also make policy-making much less
rational than the abstract idea of adaptation pathways suggests. Similarly, van Buuren
and van Popering-Verkerk (2014) already concluded that the Delta Scenarios miss out the
governance aspect, namely what the role of the state, market and civil society under
different contextual conditions would be. Still, the developed adaptation pathway also
shows measures that fit more into a resilience paradigm (e.g. ‘create more room for the
river’). To what extent a lock-in is avoided will be discussed in the next section.
6. Preventing lock-ins?
6.1. National guideline: avoiding ‘lock-ins’ and ‘lock-outs’ wherever possible
Avoiding ‘lock-ins’ and ‘lock-outs’ is explicitly mentioned in the ADM guideline
(Handreiking Adaptief Deltamanagement 2012, 4):
Thinking about the first decision and possible follow-up decisions in the long run is important
to be prepared on time for the long term challenges regarding water safety and freshwater
supply. Being able to adjust flexibly to changing social and climate conditions is necessary to
prevent so-called lock-in and lock-out situations.
Lock-in and lock-out situations both refer to situations where decisions made in the
past can compromise the adaptive capacity of a region in the long run; they only have a
different origin. A lock-in is explained as a situation in which investments in flood
defences attract more socio-economic activities behind the dike and therefore increases
the need to protect the area even more. In a lock-out situation, socio-economic
developments happen in the first place, for example next to the river, which ‘locks-out’
the option of creating more room for the river.
In the filtering process, strategies were scored on meeting the targets for water safety
and freshwater, but also in terms of their effects for e.g. nature and shipping. Evaluation
exercises were based on costbenefit analyses and expert judgement. Regarding lock-ins
and lock-outs, the ADM guideline states that they do not always have to be prevented: “It
can be a justified decision if the choice is economically viable and made consciously”
(Handreiking Adaptief Deltamanagement 2012, 6). Because most of the developments in
the Netherlands took place without taking the possibility of a flood event into account,
they consider the potential for more spatial measures as limited and only promising for a
few areas (Handreiking Adaptief Deltamanagement 2012). Avoiding lock-ins was hence
an intention, but already slightly undermined on the national level.
6.2. Rijnmond-Drechtsteden’s preferred strategy: focus on prevention, but gradual
adjustment
In Rijnmond-Drechtsteden the filtering process from possible to promising to a preferred
strategy resulted in the conclusion that large-scale interventions, like for example a ring
of weirs or a closed dam to the seaside still discussed in the phase of possible strategies,
are not required. This decision is contested. Interest groups, such as a group of engineers
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and the Agricultural and Horticultural Organization (in Dutch: Land- en
Tuinbouworganisatie) argue that closing the sea with a sluice would increase flood
protection levels, lower costs and create an adequate freshwater buffer (De Ingenieur
2014/09/10; LTO Website 2014/09/17). On the other hand, nature organisations were in
favour of opening the seaside to allow for more natural estuarine dynamics (WNF 2012).
In that sense, the sub-programme’s choice for maintaining and improving the existing
system can be seen as a middle course. In their perspective, the preferred strategy is
‘robust’ because it can cope with the predictions of the most extreme scenario (‘steam’).
Furthermore, they claim it is ‘flexible’ because it does not require large-scale measures,
but only gradual adjustments of the existing system (Deltaprogramma Rijnmond-
Drechtsteden 2014). Although this fits within the logic of how the Delta Staff defines
‘robustness’ and ‘flexibility’, it does not necessarily lead to an increased adaptive
capacity behind the dike line.
This is because the extra measures needed for gradual adjustment are mainly about
reducing the probability of flooding, i.e. dike heightening, first optimisation and eventually
replacement of storm surge barriers. Making more room for the river, rather prominent in
the adaptation pathway, is actually only thought of as effective in one part of the region, to
the east of the Island of Dordrecht. Reducing the consequences of flooding through flood-
adapted building and evacuation measures is only considered to be promising in the few
unembanked areas (e.g. Stadshavens in Rotterdam) and the Island of Dordrecht, because
most of the region lies below sea level and would be flooded quickly.
Dordrecht is a special case in that respect: it follows a more integrated approach,
although most of the island is protected by a dike ring. Parts of the dike ring, however, are
difficult to improve because the dikes are too close to historic buildings. Dordrecht
therefore already started to search for alternative solutions previous to the Delta
Programme, bringing forward the idea of a ‘multi-layer safety approach’ that combines
preventive measures with spatial planning and evacuation measures (van Herk et al. 2011).
Although only exemptions in a predominantly preventive strategy, Rijnmond-
Drechtsteden strongly emphasises the integration of water management and spatial
planning, much more than other sub-programmes do. Nevertheless, they start reasoning
from dikes. As they say in their final advice: “We see every dike as a spatial concept and
an opportunity to integrate the dike better into its spatial surrounding”. The integration of
water management and spatial planning therefore mainly gets down to a better
integration of dikes into the landscape: for example, by building ‘strong urban dikes’ that
are, in that sense, multifunctional in that they can incorporate parking lots or shops. It is
less about making the landscape resilient, so that a flood event can occur without causing
too much damage. Similarly, Van Buuren and Teisman (2014) have already concluded
that the integration of water management and spatial planning is not yet sufficient and
requires more attention in the future.
Communication about flood risks and evacuation possibilities towards citizens is
barely addressed in the preferred strategy. This seems to be intrinsic to all sub-
programmes, as the parliamentary commission evaluating the Delta Programme in 2015
pointed out: it remains unclear if flood risks and evacuation possibilities should be
communicated to citizens, and if so how (Letter to the Minister of Infrastructure and
Environment by the Parliamentary Commission, Kamerstuk 34 300 J, no. 4 [2015]). The
urgency of this question increases in the light of a recent national survey highlighting that
the majority of Dutch citizens (57%) feels insufficiently informed about flood risks,
although they trust the government to prevent flooding (IPSOS 2016).
Overall, the preferred strategy still reflects the belief that they are able to control
flooding. In case of technical failure or a flood event overtopping the dike line the
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hinterland remains vulnerable. Adaptability then gets limited to the idea of gradual
adjustments instead of being able to deal with unexpected events.
7. Reflections and conclusions
The paper started out with arguing that fostering flood resilience requires a new type of
strategic policy-making which considers the long run to enable a transformation. At the
same time, it should be adaptive to deal with uncertainties and changing circumstances.
To clarify how to make long-term water policies more adaptive in an applied sense, the
paper has put forward three theoretically defined conditions that can be used to evaluate
current governance practices: (1) an agile governance process, (2) making flexible
strategies and plans and (3) prioritising measures that prevent lock-ins.
Comparing the Delta Programme and its ADM approach to these three theoretically
defined conditions reveals certain tensions though. The main dilemma seems to be between
the desire for adaptability and the urge to control. On the one hand, the Delta Programme
shows signs of an integrated and adaptive approach to deal with uncertainties. A vast
policy programme was set up, which improved linkages and information flows between
different governmental bodies and levels. Besides, the Delta Programme was actively
searching for new insights outside the public realm, in particular through a strong
interaction with research. One of the results was the ‘Adaptive Delta Management’
approach using scenarios, tipping points and adaptation pathways to make strategies more
‘robust’ and ‘flexible’. Moreover, policy-makers were very aware of possible ‘lock-ins’,
acknowledging spatial and evacuation measures next to preventive measures.
On the other hand, the governance process remained mainly government- and expert-
driven, which limits the extent of social learning to a specific part of the social system.
Also the adaptability of the ADM approach can be questioned, when a monitoring system
is missing and strategies are designed on the basis of fixed parameters instead. In the case
of Rijnmond-Drechtsteden, this led to a preferred strategy in which adaptability mainly
gets down to gradual adjustments of certain measures, in particular dike strengthening.
Overall, the dominance of governmental authorities, the linear process of filtering
strategies, and choosing fixed parameters for designing strategies still show the struggle
of making uncertainties ‘manageable’. More critically speaking, this shows the persistent
urge to ‘predict and control’ in Dutch water management; an outcome of centuries of
technocratic-inspired policies.
To overcome this dilemma, we suggest a stronger focus on monitoring and learning. A
clear monitoring system, evaluating existing practices, as well as external developments, is
still missing at the moment. However, in the current logic of the Delta Programme, a
monitoring system is needed to identify moments when to adjust strategies and decisions.
Checking the underlying assumptions of the Delta Programme with the regular update of
existing policy instruments  as planned at the moment  seems only a beginning. A
stronger institutionalisation of a monitoring system, defining what to monitor, with whom
to discuss the results and when to take action, is needed. Particularly, because more radical
changes might be necessary in the future. Institutionalising monitoring and learning on the
one hand increases the adaptability of the current strategies; on the other hand, it gives the
government an opportunity to remain in control, as it would clearly be a governmental task.
Nonetheless, social learning should also be understood in a broader sense. Increasing
the adaptive capacity of society asks for a more active engagement with local
stakeholders and citizens. Risk communication is necessary to create more awareness and
gain support for spatial as well as evacuation measures. Furthermore, it is highly
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recommendable to make better use of local knowledge and local capacities. Through this,
measures will better suit the local context and, more importantly in the long run, local
stakeholders will feel more ownership when it comes to flood risk management.
Based on the empirical reflection of the Dutch case, we can also draw some
general lessons for planning and policy research as well as practice. First, to
facilitate an agile governance process it is crucial to think about ways to embed
learning and monitoring in the policy process before starting to develop strategies.
Cundill and Fabricius (2009) have already emphasised ‘collaborative monitoring’ as
a means to deal with uncertainty in environmental management; however, more
research is needed to substantiate the details of such an approach. Second, the case
gives some interesting insights about techniques and tools to make strategies more
flexible. Adaptation pathways and tipping points as suggested by various authors
(Reeder and Ranger 2011; W.E. Walker, Haasnoot, and Kwakkel 2013; Haasnoot
et al. 2013) are useful to think about the long run, but are rather complex and
abstract for strategic policy-making on a national and regional level. Developing
adaptation pathways on a local scale seems more feasible, because then specific
measures can be discussed in depth and better embedded into the physical, social
and political reality. Third, the case shows how difficult it is to prioritise measures
that prevent lock-ins when the system is already caught in a lock-in. The integration
of flood defence infrastructure into a broader urban planning agenda, increasing
flood protection and spatial quality at the same time, is a valuable approach as it
creates multiple gains. However, it does not really overcome the lock-in situation.
Policy-makers so far seem to have little evidence base to choose for a more radical
adaptation of the physical and social environment. As Liao (2014, 745) already
concluded, this seems to be “not a question of possibility but of choice”. We
recommend building a bigger knowledge base, based on small-scale projects and
experiments (Folke et al. 2010; Liao 2014; Pahl-Wostl 2006).
Overall, the Dutch case shows how much the institutional context matters. Because
flood risk management is a public responsibility in the Netherlands, even laid down in the
constitution, the state needs to guarantee protection and justify money allocations. As the
existing protection system is already highly advanced and no disastrous flood has
happened since 1953, it seems logical to continue with this path. It therefore raises the
question: how realistic is resilience thinking under such conditions? The ADM approach
shows that the Dutch interpret ‘adaptability’ in their own way  with a strong reliance on
governments, experts, techniques and tools. Thereby, they build upon their past. This has
the advantage that they continue with what they are good at and which has grown for
centuries. On the contrary, there is the risk that they might be caught in old patterns,
paying too little attention to increasing the adaptive capacity on land. For further research
it therefore seems interesting to explore how the adaptability discourse unfolds in other
(national) contexts, and which conditions and policy arrangements are advantageous or
disadvantageous for applying a resilience approach. Clearly, putting resilience and
adaptability from theory into practice still remains a key challenge for the future.
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Notes
1. Pluvial flooding and how to deal with it in cities was part of the sub-programme ‘new urban
developments and restructuring’.
2. The numbers are only an approximation, because particularly on the regional level, personnel
changed frequently throughout the process.
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